



Nationalism in Postindustrial Societies: Why States Still Matter

Saul Newman

Comparative Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Oct., 2000), pp. 21-41.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-4159%28200010%2933%3A1%3C21%3ANIPSW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M>

Comparative Politics is currently published by Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/PhD.html>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Nationalism in Postindustrial Societies

Why States Still Matter

Saul Newman

The central task of nationalism is to obtain and use state power.¹ In the last decade scholars of nationalism have chosen to underemphasize this task. The theoretical study of nationalism has been dominated by modernism and identity theory. Although both approaches have yielded theories that seek to explain the origins and evolution of nationalist ideas, they have directed scholarship away from the comparative study of nationalist movements and from the pursuit and use of state power. Recently, scholars of nationalism have begun to use modernist and identity theories to explain how nationalists seek to obtain power in postindustrial societies. These same theorists also argue that nationalists now create new institutions outside of the state that develop stateless nationalisms. Ironically, as the study of nationalism moves toward a comparative examination of nationalist political movements, it argues that the effort to obtain and use state power decreases in relevance. Just as nationalism helped create states, it now creates new “power containers.”² This vision of nationalism as a creative force that transforms the state is an important part of a more complex story. Nationalism is structured by nationalist movements that seek to gain control of political power. These movements simultaneously act on political institutions and are acted upon by these institutions. They are not completely structured by socioeconomic forces, as determinists would claim, nor are they the creative transformers of state power, as proponents of stateless nationalism argue. Thus, to understand nationalism we need to understand better the politics of nationalists who act in ways largely similar to all others who seek to capture or create political power. Why have theories of nationalism failed to focus on the struggle over state power? Political science theories of party politics and movements, rather than modernist or identity theories of nationalism, can help explain postindustrial nationalism through studies of particular postindustrial nationalist movements.³

The State of Nationalism

During the 1990s the study of nationalism was framed as a debate between modernists and ethnicists.⁴ This debate focused on the generic origins of national identities but had little to say about the comparative study of nationalist movements. The

modernists argued that nationalism is a functional response to the onset of modern society. The point from which all modernists emerged and diverged was the arguments of Ernest Gellner.⁵ Gellner argued that the increasing occupational specialization that accompanied economic development also required an economic integration that necessitated the creation of a uniform educational structure to train an interchangeable work force. This homogenization's ideational manifestation was nationalism. Consequently, nationalism itself was perceived as a derivative idea of the functional necessities of industrialization. For Gellner, the strategies of nationalists reflected patterns of industrialization. Nationalism did not need to be analyzed; rather, its sources needed to be explained.

Gellner's great contribution was to remove nationalism from the list of aberrant and nefarious political phenomena that could be eliminated through social and moral engineering. Modernists who followed in Gellner's wake disagreed with him over the sources of nationalism but not over its newness or permanence. The modernists saw nationalism as contingent on modernity and therefore at one level or another as an imagined, although not necessarily imaginary, identity.⁶

The dominance of the modernists was challenged by the ethnicist approach of Anthony Smith.⁷ Smith argued that *ethnies* preceded nations. In some cases they disappeared, and in others they served as the basis upon which national identities were formed. From these origins nations could emerge from the revolutions in the division of labor, control of administration, and cultural coordination that took predominantly but not exclusively high cultures and turned them into national identities.

The modernists, led by Gellner, answered Smith's approach by arguing that nations may have been created *de novo* or they may have pasts as *ethnies* but their pasts do not really matter.⁸ It does not matter whether the past of nations is fictitious or not. If it does not exist, it will be created to serve the needs of cultural homogenization of which nationalism is the integral component. National identities are recreated. What matters is not from what they are recreated but what recreates them.

Smith challenged this approach for three reasons. First, although modernist theories make a "convincing case for explaining 'nationalism-in-general,' they are often pitched at such a high level of abstraction that they cannot be easily applied to specific cases."⁹ Second, modern nationalisms emerge under differing material conditions. Materialism can not explain nationalism if it can not identify the specific material conditions that lead to its rise. Third, modernism overlooks the persistent importance of ethnic ties and identities. Gellner, while objecting to Smith's criticisms, admitted that there is uncertainty inherent in the economically determinist approaches to nationalism and that it is not always possible to tell what the patterns of nationalist mobilization may be.¹⁰

Embedded in this debate is the essence of the present weakness in the study of nationalism. The modernists can not explain the patterns of any particular nationalism and the relationship between economic change and patterns of nationalist con-

flict. Smith's argument can be taken one step further. The modernist approach has so successfully infused the dialogue on nationalism and ethnic conflict that nearly all current studies have forsaken the attempt to explain the patterns of nationalist mobilization within specific movements. When attempted, as Smith notes, modernists often emphasize economic factors that are not generalizable to all cases.¹¹

Even Smith and the ethnicists face problems in describing the ebb and flow of particular conflicts. Smith argued that modern nationalisms borrow from ethnic pasts by politicizing golden ages, myths, and heroes. The move to create these modern nationalisms emerges from the division of labor, increasing control over administration, and cultural coordination manipulated and organized into a historicist vision by the "new priesthood" of bureaucrats and intellectuals.¹² In relating this perspective to specific patterns of ethnic and nationalist activity he relied on a mixture of ethnicist and modernist factors. This theoretical *mélange* explains the rise of such movements as the result of self-interested elite motivations without explaining the pattern or trajectory of conflicts.¹³ In explaining the revival of ethnic autonomy and independence movements in advanced democracies since the 1960s, Smith emphasized loss of empire, loss of markets, increased state intervention, decline of class conflict, and the overproduction of intellectual bureaucrats. By emphasizing the role of modernizing factors, Smith appeared to violate no rules other than his own. Although he tried to tie these factors to the process of identity recreation of old *ethnies*, he ended up with a model that relies on the existence of earlier *ethnies* but does not use them to explain recent ethnic and nationalist activity. The debate over modernism and primordialism has resulted in an insufficient examination of the political patterns of nationalist conflicts.

This problem has been compounded in the last several years by a growing emphasis on identity in the study of ethnicity and nationalism. This emphasis has come from several different directions, including the psychological approach of Donald Horowitz. His approach encouraged the growth of scholarship that emphasizes the independent explanatory force of identity formation. The study of ethnic identity has been most influenced by postmodernist and ideational histories. Postmodernism argued that the very essence of politics is the power relationships that are manifested through the manipulation of ideas and identities. Understanding politics involved understanding power relationships and how these relationships define the perceptions of individuals through culture and ideas regarding their relationships to others. This emphasis on relationships among self and other and its influence on identity precisely mirrored the framework of ethnic and national relationships as self/other relationships defining identities mediated by power. Scholars now had a new way, or more appropriately a "neo-way," of addressing identity, and this new tool preordained the questions that would be asked and the answers that would be given. Not explained were the trajectory, ideology, successes, and failures of modern nationalist movements.

The emphasis on understanding the struggle over ideas manifested itself in such diverse works as Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* and Linda Colley's *Britons*.¹⁴ Anderson's definition of a nation as an "imagined political community" became the rallying cry for those who examined the imaginings that defined nations.¹⁵ Both authors were concerned with the formation of national identities starting in the eighteenth century. Both, particularly Colley, partially conflated nationalism and national identity with political mobilization. Nationalism emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries concomitantly with political mobilization on a universal scale in the name of nationalism. In describing nationalism these authors also described the expansion of political participation within the territorial and temporal confines of nations unified by a single state. For both, nationalism was largely a search for a new political identity among the previously unpoliticized. Partially as a result, nationalism has been less successful in explaining patterns of identity change in already mobilized societies than it has been in newly mobilizing societies. By emphasizing the role of identity in nationalism, studies of nationalism have emphasized theories of the origins of nationalism rather than theories of their trajectory. They have also chosen to emphasize ideas and identities without studying the political context in which these ideas and identities operate.

Bringing the State Back In and Taking It Out Again

John Breuilly said it best. "To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or modernization is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and politics is about power. The central task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power."¹⁶ Breuilly's challenge remains largely unfulfilled. Modernism, ethnicism, and identity theory have all conspired to leave politics out of the theoretical debate on nationalism. While social and economic change and its impact on identities affect the evolution of nationalism, they do not so much explain patterns of nationalist mobilization as they provide the raw materials for such mobilization. Theories of modern nationalism should depart from this observation. Social and economic modernization may foster the new potential identities and symbols for ethnic and nationalist politicization, but these myths alone do not determine the patterns of ethnic and nationalist mobilization. Rather, they should be looked upon as the fungible resources for the politicization of ethnicity and nationalism. This politicization is a function of the political pressures that force them to be used in certain ways. The pressures come from nationalists who seek the most efficient paths to capturing state power. The organization of nationalist movements, their resources, leadership, and ideologies, and the structure of the state and its policies help define the most efficient mechanisms for capturing state power.

Recently, Breuilly's concerns finally have become a focus of productive scholarly

interest. Michael Keating has examined how nationalists in postindustrial democracies seek to capture political power from the state by creating new loci of power outside of the state.¹⁷ He argues that with the declining ability of states to manage their territories nationalists create new sources of power within civil society by constructing stateless nationalisms. Ironically, Breuilly's interest in movements that capture state power has become a focus of comparative study just as scholars see the state as declining.

Keating argues that there are two ideal types of nationalism, ethnic and civic, and that within postindustrial polities civic nationalism is preeminent and is transforming the nationalist debate. In ethnic nationalism "the nation is defined on the basis of ascriptive criteria and differentiation rather than inclusion and assimilation."¹⁸ Civic nationalism is territorially based; anyone within the territory is eligible to adopt the common values and identity that define this inclusive nationalism. Civic nationalism is on the rise as market forces erode the state from "above, below and laterally" by limiting its autonomy and enhancing the creation of new forms of social and political identity.¹⁹ Many of these new identities recognize the complexity of contemporary identities and the limited sovereignty of the modern state. Keating argues that the nationalist elites of Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland seek through civic nationalism to develop a place in the new international order. Nationalism is now articulated by more than the ethnoregional and nationalist parties of the 1960s through 1980s. Both these parties and their rivals have devised a nationalism that recognizes the growing importance of international trade regimes at the expense of sovereign states. The province of Quebec, the autonomous region of Catalonia, and the Scottish parliament all participate in the process of stateless nation building.

For Keating, as civic nationalism grows and ethnic nationalism weakens, nation building is the purview of both civil society and the state. Social and state institutions both act, short of independence, to demarcate the new political relationships that emerge as national identities reconstitute themselves to fit a changed political reality and conception of sovereignty. These new national structures challenge class and state structures and identities. Within these new structures some movements and parties still advocate sovereign independence, but increasingly they are outnumbered by nationalists who recognize that older conceptions of nationalism are becoming irrelevant. For some nationalists the state must be broken down and reconstituted in response to the new economic realities. Traditional party leaders who come at the problem from the opposite direction meet these new progressive nationalists by adapting the state and civil society to new economic realities; they strengthen national institutions through devolved state and civil organizations.

Keating's approach blends a modernist's concern with the economically determined aspects of nationalism and Breuilly's concern with political power. He argues that nationalist identities and ideologies are determined predominantly, though not exclusively, by processes of socioeconomic change that force elites in the state and

civil society to adapt to emerging conditions. Thus, although these new forces mold the behaviors of actors within existing structural, legal, and ideological constraints, they can eventually overwhelm them. Moreover, these socioeconomic changes challenge the sovereignty of the state. While nationalist movements are important, the arena of political conflict is moving away from state institutions that no longer structure nationalist conflict.

The State in Postindustrial Nationalism

Although Keating sees nationalist movements as agents of change that are transforming the structures of political power, in many ways the state has conditioned the structure and behavior of nationalist movements. Nationalist movements have been followers, not innovators, as can be seen by examining three of the most important questions about postindustrial nationalist movements. Why did these movements arise? Why did they choose their strategies and tactics? Why did some succeed and others fail in accomplishing their stated goals? These three questions can best be answered through the role of nationalist movements as seekers of state power, the importance of politics and the state, and examination of how the structure of the state, its policies, the influence of political party systems, and the structural opportunities and constraints on political mobilization condition the behavior of nationalist movements in making political choices.

Numerous nationalist challenges to democratic states emerged in the 1960s.²⁰ The adoption of regional economic policies in advanced industrial democracies in the early 1960s politicized these nationalisms. The tensions embedded in the centralization and bureaucratization of the 1940s and 1950s provided the conditions for the rise of regional concerns. The states and the traditional parties, in spite of their commitment to centralization, began to advocate regional policies in response to these tensions. These states were centralizing political power and trying to mute the negative impact of unfettered economic forces. National governments created extensive social welfare schemes, regulated economic institutions, and stimulated economic growth to limit the debilitating consequences of the business cycle. Regional governments merely helped execute national policies. Nevertheless, this centralization provided the impetus for a new emphasis on regional concerns. In the late 1950s and early 1960s states developed regional policies in response to the growing concern with regional problems. These policies intensified the attention that was paid to regional political issues, provided an arena for new perceptions of ethnic identities, and helped to legitimize the agendas of movements that advocated autonomy or independence.²¹

State policies also conditioned the strategies of nationalist movements. Some ethnic and nationalist movements in democracies have peacefully challenged the sover-

eignty of the state, while others have resorted to political violence. These movements are differentiated primarily by this distinction between peaceful and violent strategies. Structural conditions can account for the variation in the intensity and form of conflict. Most nationalist movements in postindustrial democracies have been peaceful and consensual. They developed their ideologies in response to the regional political consensus during their rise. Except for their advocacy of independence or autonomy, they were not policy innovators. The success of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in the 1970s forced it to piece together a socioeconomic agenda that in the party leader's own words was social democratic even if considerable disagreements persisted within the party. The *Plaid Cymru* (PC), at the time of its electoral rise, was concerned with promoting Welsh language usage. Over time electoral pressures led the *Plaid Cymru* to develop a social democratic agenda. The socioeconomic agenda of *Volksunie* (VU) promised to provide assistance to preserve the livelihoods of small businessmen and farmers who were overrepresented in Flemish nationalist organizations, while it developed a progressive federalist wing interested in using the powers of a federal system to promote social and economic reforms. The party of Brussels francophones, the *Front Démocratique des Francophones* (FDF), was formed by former liberal, socialist, and Catholic activists. In developing its social and economic policies, the FDF tried delicately to balance these different groups. By the early 1970s, however, it developed an electoral alliance with a portion of Brussels' Liberal party. The *Rassemblement Wallon* (RW) grew out of the Walloon trade union movement and sought to protect the livelihood of workers in declining mining and heavy industry.²² The *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) in Catalonia rapidly became the largest party after the reinstitutionalization of democracy in the late 1970s. The CiU adopted a moderate socioeconomic policy while pursuing a role for Catalonia in the European Union. The *Basque Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) also presented a moderate program advocating greater autonomy for Euskadi and centrist socioeconomic policies.²³

These parties' socioeconomic policies were consensual. They did not depart radically from the positions of the major parties. In fact, their socioeconomic agendas were closer to the socioeconomic agendas of the majority parties than to any other parties in their ethnoregions. The SNP and PC differed in the specifics of their policies with the Labour Party, but they shared the broad philosophy of full employment, a mixed economy, active government, conciliation with unions, and respect for technocratic expertise. Although they differed over issues of state structure, the three Belgian parties were closest to the dominant parties in their respective ethnoregions on socioeconomic issues. The VU resembled the Flemish Christian Democratic party (CVP) in supporting the welfare state while emphasizing conservative economic policies and Flemish Catholic cultural concerns. The FDF adopted its ideology canton by canton to resemble the dominant party in each canton while forming an alliance with the regionally dominant Liberals. The RW disagreed with the Walloon

Socialist party (PSB) over the status of Wallonia, but both were committed to government intervention to assist working class voters. By the time the *Parti Québécois* (PQ) was elected to govern Quebec in 1976, its moderate policies did not differ radically from the Liberals (PLQ).

These parties followed the ideological currents within their regions to increase their support and attain their primary goals of autonomy or independence. They were radical on only a single issue. Scholars of nationalism look too hard for the unique character of nationalist movements in postindustrial societies and miss the banality of their stretch for political power. Nationalist parties might be studied more fruitfully as parties than as a unique form of nationalist party or movement.

The State and Nationalist Terrorism in Postindustrial Societies

Even violent nationalist movements responded to political pressures from the state rather than transformed the power of the state. Nationalist terrorism occurs when two conditions are met. First, ethnic or national identities must be politically salient and exclusive of other identities. Members of the group must identify themselves as members of the group and see their personal political interests as linked to the interests of the group as a whole. Second, opportunities for nonviolent political participation must be viewed as inadequate by the most radical members of the nationalist movement because the group lacks access to regional political institutions and influence within the central government or because patterns of political mobility within the group are structured to exclude nationalist radicals. Because existing political institutions have been shaped over centuries, historical factors have contributed to the creation of exclusive ethnic identities and restricted opportunities for the group's political participation. A history of repression of an ethnic group by the state is a crucial factor in the creation of the antagonistic ethnic identities that fuel nationalist terrorism. Thus, the sources of nationalist terror in postindustrial societies rest on the political factors that lead states to repress ethnic groups during periods of state expansion. The factors that condition this repression include the potential military threat posed by the region to the central state, the extent to which ethnic groups compete over land and other scarce economic resources, and the political centralization of the state itself.

Where entrenched elites dominate regional political institutions and ethnic parties and restrict access to new groups of ethnic elites, disenfranchised elites may turn to terrorism. Protestant England sat lightly on Presbyterian Scotland and allowed for the continuity of the Scottish legal and educational systems. Dual Scottish and British identities kept nationalism peaceful. In Ireland, however, the perceived threat posed by Catholic Ireland, in alliance with Catholic France, engendered a repressive, religiously delineated, mutually exclusive identity that fostered the conditions for

violence. In Quebec, where language differences compounded the religious divisions seen in Ireland, the state sat comparatively lightly and semiconsociationally on the French-Canadians because the virtually unlimited availability of land made the kind of repressive policies imposed in relatively land-scarce Ireland unnecessary. Terrorism was short-lived and died out after the decision by the increasingly successful PQ to allow individual radical nationalists to become party members. Franco's repression of Basque autonomy created the conditions for Basque terrorism but did not draw the identity distinctions within Basque society that would have led to internal civil war between native Basques and immigrants, as in Northern Ireland. Finally, the difference between the strategies of Basque and Catalan nationalism was a function of state structures during the early stages of the nationalist movements. Because the Spanish state had guaranteed some Basque autonomy through the *fueros*, which gave taxing and spending powers to local Basque villages, Basque nationalism emphasized rural nationalism with no ideological space for the integration of urban classes. When student radicals formed the precursors of the terrorist *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA), they organized outside of the conservative, rural nationalist movement. The lack of similar state structures in Catalonia, combined with the dominance of the consumer goods industry, created a more inclusive and less violent nationalism.²⁴ State structures played a crucial role in delimiting the ideological alternatives presented by the patterns of social and economic change.

Moreover, the structure of party systems greatly influences whether nationalist parties will be conflictual or consensual, electorally competitive, and successful or unsuccessful in transforming governing structures.²⁵ According to a Downsian approach, parties will tend toward the center in two party systems and toward more unique political positions in multiparty systems. In two party systems nationalist or ethnoregional parties are not consensual on socioeconomic issues and do not advocate minor changes in the structure of states leading to greater autonomy. Dual consensuels would be easily accommodated and eliminated by the major parties in the system. Instead, electorally successful nationalist parties in two party postindustrial democracies are structural radicals committed to independence but consensual on socioeconomic issues to attract more voters. These parties are electorally resilient because they can not be accommodated and eliminated by nonnationalist parties. Examples of such parties include the SNP and PQ. Dual radical parties such as the Basque *Herri Batasuna* (HB), which advocate independence and radical socioeconomic policies, arise in multiparty systems where they can claim a unique ideological space. They receive stable but low electoral support, as they are safely ensconced on the fringes of the electoral spectrum. These dual radicals are not likely to be included in the policy process by more mainstream actors. Finally, dual consensual parties appear in multiparty systems where their policies are likely to be implemented, sometimes at the expense of the parties' electoral support, as was the case in Belgium.

The design of parliamentary and policymaking systems in the state and particularly the party system also plays an important role in the policy successes of nationalist movements.²⁶ In consociational party systems, such as Belgium, parties that expressed demands for regional autonomy or federal status met with early success because their electoral success threatened the stability of consociational bargaining. Political elites negotiated consociational compromises that created a federal system ahead of demands from a majority of the Belgian population in order to protect the privileged position of elites in the bargaining and policymaking processes. In majoritarian systems, where traditional party elites were less directly threatened by the rise of ethnoregional or nationalist parties, the major parties allowed referenda, rather than compromises with ethnoregional or nationalist party elites, to decide on new governmental structures. In Wales and Scotland voters chose a devolved assembly and a parliament, respectively. In Canada federal policymaking is both consociational and majoritarian; the provincial premiers negotiate a consensus with the prime minister and then submit it to the provincial legislatures or a referendum. Provincially, Quebec uses a majoritarian system; referenda decide whether to negotiate or declare independence. Thus, the independence movement in Canada has been depoliticized and repoliticized as consociational agreements to develop a new constitution have gone down to defeat in majoritarian votes in the provincial assemblies and a national referendum. These defeats, in turn, have energized the independence movement to hold provincial referenda. The referenda have been defeated, weakening the independence drive. This ebb and flow has defined the nationalist movement in Quebec in the last twenty years even more than the patterns of socioeconomic change.²⁷ Once again, the structure of the state defined the choices available to the nationalist movement. Is globalization changing the state's role in defining these choices?

Does Globalization Mean the State Matters Less to Nationalists?

Even if nationalist movements in the past appeared to be reacting to the opportunities embedded in party systems, policymaking structures, and state-society relations, in the last decade transformations in nationalist ideologies appear to support Keating's contention that globalization is providing the opportunities for nationalists to transform state authority. The first attempts to mobilize support for independence or autonomy in these regions focused largely on the economic perils of maintaining the centralized state.²⁸ They were challenged by state elites who claimed that the regions would be unable to compete in a global economy as small states without the leverage and markets provided by the larger states. Fear of the economic consequences of independence inhibited support for independence.²⁹ In more recent attempts to achieve independence or enhanced powers in Quebec and Scotland less

emphasis has been placed on the economic need for independence, and more attention has been focused on the increased viability of an independent Quebec or Scotland. Most of the criticisms of centralized states have focused on their deleterious political rather than economic interference. This transformation indicates important changes in nationalist politics. First, the early successes of these nationalist movements, combined with regional policies, have lessened economic imbalances. Second, nationalist politicians are focusing more on globalization of trade and free trade agreements to convince potential supporters of the economic viability of small independent states.

It is not clear, however, whether globalization will foster stateless nations. There is a difference between globalization as a tool of mobilization and as the new face of nationalism. Globalization is important, but not precisely in the manner Keating envisions. Hudson Meadwell and Pierre Martin argue that international economic integration may aid nationalist movements in mobilizing support for independence.³⁰ Although the initial demand for independence may not stem from economic calculations, the ability to mobilize support for independence may be tied to international economic interdependence. In a mercantilist world the perceived costs of secession will be high, as the central state will seek to deny market access to the new nation. But “freer trade in a tight institutional setting lowers the barriers to exit for groups contemplating secession.”³¹

[T]he conjunction of a well-established liberal international trade regime and the proper institutional setting has two main effects. It has the potential of enlarging the size of the mobilisable public by contributing to efforts to refocus collective identification; it also lowers the barriers to independence constituted by the costs of repositioning the new state in the trading order.³²

Meadwell and Martin emphasize the role of elites who control selective incentives, can frame political debates, use state structures and state policies to mold nationalist identities and national actions, and consequently increase support for nationalism. In addition, because many potential and actual nationalists remain wary of the economic consequences of independence, a stable liberal international trade regime limits fears that independence will disrupt existing international trade relationships. Although they emphasize the importance of the state in determining the mobilizational capacity of movements, they also argue that nationalist elites increasingly manipulate the symbols that emerge from outside of the sovereign state. Independent representation in international free trade regimes and supranational agencies may enhance the economic viability of newly independent states, but the existence of these regimes and agencies limit the sovereignty of states and provide a set of mobilizing frames outside of the state. While Meadwell and Martin have identified the rational predisposition of self-interested national elites, they understand

that within nationalist movements activists remain committed to independence rather than some form of nationalism devoid of statehood.

If globalization enhances the conditions for a stateless civic nationalism, some nationalist movements in postindustrial societies are not feeling its effects. Keating chose his three cases to reflect three different forms of civic nationalism. Unfortunately, forms of uncivic nationalism are alive and well. The fastest growing party in Flanders is the *Vlaams Blok* (VB). It is a nationalist, antiimmigrant party that has campaigned for the complete independence of Flanders, restriction of immigration and the rights of immigrants, and the removal of "cultural impurities."³³ In tone and temperament the VB shares much more in common with such parties as France's National Front than it does with the civic nationalist parties. It was the most successful of all the antiimmigrant parties of the 1980s and 1990s.³⁴

The Italian Northern League shares some characteristics in common with the VB but differs in other ways.³⁵ The Northern League and its constituency are largely devoid of ethnic trappings. Most of its constituents speak Italian and do not tap a distinctive ethnocultural identity.³⁶ Yet they remain exclusive in their newfound nationalism. The Northern League, in addition to opposing Roman misrule, has often adopted a virulently antiimmigrant agenda.

Globalization's only effect on these two parties, if any, is to repel them away from a vision of a progressive, multinational future. Flanders and northern Italy are two of the more economically dynamic regions in Europe and are the wealthier regions in their own states. The ideologies of these parties can not be attributed to the same socioeconomic forces that explain the rise of civic nationalism. Why have different parties seen the salvation of nationalism in ethnic or civic forms?

Herbert Kitschelt argues that new radical right parties are most likely to emerge when the major political parties move toward the ideological center during a period of political consensus.³⁷ The most successful new radical right parties have combined xenophobic and culturally authoritarian appeals with strong commitments to free market liberalism. Although he does not classify the VB and Northern League as pure new radical right parties because of their territorial nationalism, they certainly belong to the same xenophobic free market genus. They both arose in party systems where the major right of center political party had moved to the ideological left, leaving the right wing of the political spectrum open for mobilization by new right-wing nationalist parties. In Belgium the repeated creation of either grand coalitions or Christian Democratic-Socialist coalitions to guarantee national and regional majorities for constitutional reform doubly transformed the CVP. The need and later desire to form these coalitions inched the CVP to the left and alienated Flemish conservatives. The CVP's cooperation with Walloon Socialists prompted the mobilization of conservative Flemish nationalist opposition.³⁸

In Italy the Northern League rose as the Christian Democratic party (DC) collapsed. For decades the Italian party and governing systems depended on the

Christian Democratic party's ability to provide services and patronage networks that guaranteed it electoral support; the Christian Democratic party expanded throughout the public and private sectors to create a fusion of party and state.³⁹ This system was threatened by two changes. First, the economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s broke down ties between social groups and parties. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union undermined the polarization between the DC and Communist party that had allowed the party-state to persist. The Northern League attacked Christian Democratic misrule by focusing on the DC's network of corrupt relationships with southern businessmen, politicians, and organized criminals. This system increased the corrupt power of the south at the expense of the north. The "clean hands" investigations and indictments substantiated many of the Northern League's contentions and thus enhanced its popularity as the political system, dominated by the Christian Democrats, collapsed.

These cases differ dramatically from Keating's examples of civic nationalism. The SNP, CîU, and PQ all competed in regions where left of center parties dominated. In Great Britain and Spain conservative parties retained their commitment to free market policies from the 1970s through the 1990s and did not form coalitions with the left. Thus, no ideological space for radical right nationalisms existed. In Canada the moderation of the Progressive Conservatives encouraged the formation of the Reform Party, a right-wing territorial, if not explicitly nationalist, party. Although the SNP, CîU, and PQ have all adopted the rhetoric of globalization, it would be premature to argue that socioeconomic changes are uniformly transforming postindustrial nationalisms. The structure of party systems still plays an important role in determining the patterns of postindustrial nationalisms. Political parties simultaneously tap state, national, ethnic, and European identities.

Keating does not discuss nationalist political parties alone. Indeed, he focuses his argument on the previously nonnationalist parties and elites that have been instrumental in creating the institutions that enshrine civic nationalism. Is their transformation into stateless nationalists a redefinition of the nationalist enterprise in response to "the crisis of the nation-state in the face of globalization and Europeanization," or is it a response to the behavior of nationalist parties?⁴⁰

A Stateless Response to Globalization or a State's Response to Nationalism?

Keating's major theoretical contribution is his analysis of how previously nonnationalist parties and actors have usurped nationalism in its stateless form.⁴¹ Scots, Catalans, and Québécois have found mechanisms to overcome the state's loss of control while inserting these regions into supranational networks. This new form of stateless nationalism, both in and outside nationalist movements, is supplanting sovereignty-oriented nationalism.

The rush to create new stateless nationalist entities by nonnationalist traditional parties may be little more than a response to the electoral threat posed by nationalist movements and parties such as the SNP. Issues of structural reform and devolution arose in 1968 in the Conservative Party after the initial successes of the SNP and, not surprisingly, dissipated after its decline from 1970 to 1973. The Labour Party moved aggressively toward devolution following the SNP's successes of 1974. Even then the halting manner in which the Labour Party pushed its devolution bill allowed backbenchers to derail it.

Although the Scottish Labour Party showed its commitment to a Scottish parliament at the Scottish constitutional convention, its recommendations were implemented by the British Labour Party under Tony Blair. Why did the Labour Party accede to the creation of the Scottish parliament? According to the Europeanist perspective, the forces behind a devolved Scottish parliament recognized the decline of state sovereignty and the European drive toward subsidiarity. If this explanation were correct, the creation of the Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly would have to be seen as part of a larger attempt to develop federalism or subsidiarity throughout the U.K. and Europe. However, advocates of federalism and subsidiarity played little or no role in British devolution. The Labour Party pushed devolution only after the second wave of SNP successes in 1974. That year the Labour Party formed a minority government that relied on SNP support to remain in power. In 1997 Tony Blair became prime minister when the Labour Party was elected. Clearly, he did not need SNP votes and could not be accused of supporting devolution to buy off SNP voters. For Tony Blair devolution was part of an attempt to "decentralize power, open government, reform parliament and increase individual rights."⁴² This attempt included the creation of the assembly and parliament, an elected mayor for London, incorporation into the European Convention of Human Rights, freedom of information, and reforms of the House of Lords and Commons. The bill that created the parliament gave Scotland only consultative powers in the EU, retaining for Britain the power that a Europeanist might expect to be diverted to the Scottish parliament. Finally, the differentiation between the power granted to Scotland and Wales and the nonexistence of English regions reveals the limitations of the globalization approach. Although global economic change is significant, it is more likely that nationalism is influencing nonnationalists to find alternative ways to preserve the state rather than that globalization is transforming everyone into stateless nationalists.

Most other nationalist movements in postindustrial democracies appear to act in similar ways. In Quebec there appears to have been a decline in commitment to stateless nationalism within the PQ. In the 1970s and early 1980s the PQ advocated sovereignty-association, which foresaw tighter links to Canada than the independence advocated in the mid 1980s or the association toyed with in the 1990s. These variations seemed closely tied to the electoral fate of sovereignty and negotiations over constitutional reform. The PQ rejected association after Canada repatriated the

constitution without Quebec and rediscovered association when support for independence sagged prior to the 1995 provincial referendum. The PLQ challenged federalism when Canada rejected the Meech Lake Accords and rediscovered federalism in time for the Charlottetown Agreement.

In Belgium the commitment of the major parties to regional autonomy followed the successes and later stabilization in support of the community parties.⁴³ Their continued commitment to regional autonomy represents an attempt to maintain the separation necessary to make consociational multiparty coalitions work.

In Spain attitudes toward stateless nationalism differ by region. While the CiU government in Catalonia has been committed to a form of stateless nationalism, in the Basque region the governing PNV has filled out the powers of the autonomous region but under pressure from radical nationalists has retained a commitment to sovereignty. Using the powers granted it in the 1970s, while retaining hope for independence, the Basque regional government may be practicing stateless nationalism.

Embedded in Keating's argument is the oft-repeated liberal view that the opening of the world for trade and the prosperity that inevitably results from this trade represent the most effective means to overcome nationalist conflicts. Recent developments in negotiating peace agreements for intractable conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Ireland, as well as a cease-fire in Euskadi, have led globalization theorists to credit this progress to economic integration. Do these arguments make logical and empirical sense? How might they affect our understanding of Keating's stateless nationalism?

Negotiating Settlements to Violent Nationalisms: The Globalization Dimension

In Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain nationalist movements have engaged in terrorist campaigns. Rather than create the conditions for the emergence of a stateless civil society that would ally itself with global trade opportunities, they sought independence and thus created the worst possible conditions for inclusion in international trade. It could be argued that the signing of the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland, the inclusion of ETA's indirect political arm in the Basque governing coalition, and the cease-fire in Euskadi indicated the powerful force of globalization on the structure of nationalist conflicts. Several assumptions would have to hold true for this argument to be correct. First, the conflicts' roots would need to be tied to the failure of Northern Irish and Basque society to foster economic equality and the cross-national conditions that promote equality. Second, patterns of economic integration and recognition of their importance would have played indispensable roles in the movement toward settlements. Third, a civil society would have to have emerged and committed all sides to the formation of a stateless nationalism.

John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary have examined the relevance of these argu-

ments to Northern Ireland.⁴⁴ They argue that there are nationalist, Unionist, and Europeanist perspectives on economic integration.⁴⁵ Liberal nationalists have argued that the breakdown of economic barriers between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will weaken Protestant opposition to unification. Unionists have argued that the European Union and the decline in state sovereignty will give Northern Ireland the status of an autonomous European region within the U.K. Europeanists see in integration the chance to create new plural identities that will weaken the identities that reinforce the conflict.⁴⁶ McGarry and O'Leary argue, in response, that, although economic injustices need to be rectified and may be catalysts for conflict, they are neither its source nor its solution. Individual economic issues are important in societies where there is a consensus on national identity, but national identities matter more than economic differences in multiethnic states. Economic imbalances are important primarily because of their linkage to the national question, as demonstrated by the overwhelming support for parties that are divided on the national question rather than socioeconomic issues. The worst off in society are not most likely to protest present conditions actively. In addition, nationalist movements rarely offer the most economically beneficial option for their adherents.

McGarry and O'Leary also argue that there is no clear evidence that European integration can provide or has provided the conditions to resolve this dispute. States themselves create the greatest likelihood for integrated trade, yet intrastate nationalist conflict continues. Not even the lowering of economic boundaries between the north and the south has overcome political rivalries. O'Leary and McGarry note that, if anything, issues of Europeanization have become fodder for both sides to strengthen their positions. Protestants see the EU as a mechanism that can provide a new status for Northern Ireland within the U.K., while nationalists see it as aiding the cause of uniting Ireland.⁴⁷

Keating might respond that these arguments are beside the point. Globalization hand in hand with transformations in conceptions of sovereignty, not economic cooperation, resolves the conflict. There are indications that the business community first realized the value of economic and political cooperation, and European integration intensified that feeling and expanded it to groups that had been reluctant to compromise.⁴⁸ Moreover, the Good Friday Agreement, with its commitment to the creation of cross-national governing and advisory bodies, is precisely the type of arrangement that fosters stateless nationalism. This argument assumes that the debate over sovereignty in Northern Ireland has been transformed into a debate over maximizing Northern Irish autonomy within new political institutions. The creation of an assembly and the recognition of cross-border bodies could be steps in that direction. But it might also be a mistake to see them as a challenge to sovereignty and as part of the emergence of a new stateless nationalism. The radicals on both sides do not see the problem in these terms. The Unionist rejectionists continue to argue for complete British sovereignty. Even Sinn Féin, a party to the agreement, has

not diminished its commitment to unification. One could argue, however, that the creation of these institutions indicates a new conception of sovereignty. The jury is still out. Not only has it been difficult to implement the agreement with respect to decommissioning weapons, but the negotiations were also primarily driven by the interests of the two sovereign states, Ireland and Great Britain, to take advantage of the military exhaustion and increasing political savvy of Sinn Féin and the IRA. The states sacrificed some of their sovereignty for an agreement. Only time will tell if the warring factions will seize this opportunity to solidify and expand these institutions and create stateless nations.

The conflict in Euskadi is changing as well. In the last ten years support for, incidents of, and deaths from ETA terrorism have been declining.⁴⁹ The PNV has focused more on using the governing levers of the autonomous region than on attacking the Spanish government. In the last several months important progress has been made to end the terror campaign peacefully. *Herri Batasuna*, the political arm of ETA, has reconfigured itself and entered the governing coalition for the first time. ETA has declared a cease-fire and begun to probe a negotiated solution with other Basque parties and the Spanish government.

Has a new stateless nationalism emerged? Probably no more or less than twenty-five years ago. Total support for Basque nationalist political parties has remained largely unchanged since the founding of the autonomous region. Support for the radical parties has gone up, and support for the PNV has gone down. If support for the radical parties is rising at the expense of the moderate nationalists, it is difficult to argue that civic nationalism is emerging. ETA may give up terrorism, but its political arm is a long way from rejecting traditional nationalism. The new stateless nationalism may be on the way, but the wheels of change grind exceedingly slowly. Nationalist sentiment still sees the EU as a weapon rather than as a solution. It is portrayed in the nationalist press as an undemocratic institution that will not serve Basque interests until Euskadi is sovereign.⁵⁰ Once again, the evidence of the movement toward civic nationalism in postindustrial societies is not conclusive.

Toward the Study of Nationalism as Politics

The study of nationalism has been paradoxical. The modernists have argued that nationalism is a dependent variable, a functional response to modernity with little value as an explanatory factor by itself. In the last decade scholars have recognized the independent explanatory effects of nationalism and theorized about its psychological and even sociobiological components. These two approaches have come from diametrically opposite directions and have yet to meet in the middle. Modernists focus on the socioeconomic determinants of nationalism. They care little for the composition of nationalist ideologies, the political systems in which nationalist

movements operate, or the choices they make. Identity theorists care greatly about the composition of nationalist ideologies and their explanatory power as independent variables but little about the political context of nationalist movements and their choices. In the rush to capture the power of nationalism and develop a unique cross-disciplinary approach, we have underplayed the political context of nationalism.

Globalization theorists have been keen to emphasize both the economic and political contexts in which nationalisms operate. In addition, they have focused on how these changes provide opportunities for nationalist movements to recreate their identities in important new ways. These theorists have gone a long way in bringing politics back in to the study of nationalism by bridging the gap between modernist and identity theories and contextualizing them in terms of the political choices nationalist movements make. They should be praised. However, their analyses all lead away from the state. Nationalist movements still seek sovereignty by capturing state power, even if state power is less than it once was. In order to capture the state and redesign it to their own liking nationalist movements have to navigate the political systems in which they operate and make choices about how to seize control within parameters still largely defined by the state.

To study nationalist movements scholars need to look at how the state structures choices. Socioeconomic change provides opportunities for the development of resources and action frames for nationalist movements, but they have to be captured and manipulated within the confines of the political system. Nationalists organize to challenge the authority of postindustrial states. Their organization is related to their ideology and identity. Identities and ideologies are as much a function of the institutional context as of socioeconomic conditions. Centralizing states choose to repress or not to repress national minorities. Although their decisions may be rooted in such conditions as scarcity of economic resources, they result in their own dynamic that influences the willingness of nationalist movements to develop a civic or ethnic nationalism.

While they may seek to use civil society to create stateless nationalist institutions, most postindustrial nationalists remain focused primarily on capturing the state through competition for votes. Nationalist parties construct their ideologies and identities in competitive political systems where they must search for ideological opportunities. Globalization provides an opportunity for nationalists to mobilize support in a new way, but this new way just offers tools to gain support rather than defines the future trend of nationalism. Because the fundamental structure of postindustrial economies is sufficiently similar across countries, it is unable to account for the wide variation in ideology among nationalist movements, not to mention the presence and absence of nationalist movements in socioeconomically similar cases. Violent ethnic nationalisms emerge in political systems where the democratic process does not allow for participation by nationalist radicals and the state represses

nationalist movements and reinforces exclusivist national identities. The encouragement of civic nationalisms by globalization may lead to the decline of these violent movements, but they have not yet declined. Furthermore, a new conservative consensus in favor of less government and the leftward slide of some conservative parties have created the conditions for the emergence of conservative and occasionally ethnic nationalisms, as in Flanders and Northern Italy. The increasing commitment among previously left of center nationalist parties to the rhetoric of global free trade represents an ideological choice made within shifting party systems as much as it reflects the changing socioeconomic reality.

Conclusion

“Only through a proper interpretation...that emphasizes the relationship between macroeconomic and political changes and their influence on specific political movements and institutions can we live up to the promise of the modernization paradigm, create an integrated theory of ethnic conflict, and address many of the essential questions that most students of ethnic conflict have not yet considered.”⁵¹ This appeal remains true today. Globalization theorists are probably right when they argue that a transformation is taking place within postindustrial nationalisms. This transformation, however, is not unilinear. The socioeconomic forces that bring about these changes act in particular contexts. These contexts include the structure of party systems, the state’s response to minority nationalisms, and the patterns of institutional and policy changes. These factors are important not only in older, postindustrial democracies, but in democratizing nations as well. The break-up of Czechoslovakia was largely a function of developments within its party system. The study of nationalism would be well-advised to keep nationalist movements and parties front and center in its analyses. Party system, political movement, and even neoinstitutional theory can keep the study of nationalism focused on the search for political power.

NOTES

1. John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 1.
2. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
3. See Joseph R. Rudolph and Robert J. Thompson, eds., *Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy, and the Western World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, *Ethnopolitics in the New Europe* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
4. David McCrone, *The Sociology of Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 1–21.
5. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
6. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983).
7. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

8. Ernest Geller, "Reply: Do Nations Have Navels?," *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (1996), 369.
9. Anthony D. Smith, "Anthony D. Smith's Opening Statement: Nations and Their Pasts," *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (1996), 361.
10. Gellner, "Reply: Do Nations Have Navels?," p. 369.
11. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 144–64.
12. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*.
13. Saul Newman, "Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict?," *World Politics*, 43 (1991), 457–58.
14. Anderson; Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
15. Anderson, p. 6.
16. Breuilly, p. 1.
17. Michael Keating, *Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland* (London: Macmillan, 1996).
18. Michael Keating, "Stateless Nation-Building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the Changing State System," *Nations and Nationalism*, 3 (1997), 690.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 691–92.
20. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, pp. 163–83.
21. Michael Keating, *State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1988); Michael Keating, "Minority Nationalism and the State: The European Case," in Michael Watson, ed., *Contemporary Minority Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 174–93.
22. CEPESS, "Programmes électoraux et accord gouvernemental 1968," p. 121.
23. Juan Linz, *Conflicto en Euskadi* (Madrid: Esapa Calpe, 1986), pp. 325–57.
24. Juan Diez Medrano, *Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 114–29.
25. Saul Newman, "Ideological Trends among Ethnoregional Parties in Post-Industrial Democracies," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 3 (Spring 1997), 28–60.
26. Saul Newman, *Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies: Mostly Ballots, Rarely Bullets* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. 235–39.
27. Robert Bernier, Vincent Lemieux, and Maurice Pinard, *Un Combat Inachevé* (Quebec: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1997), pp. 101–250.
28. Newman, *Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies*, pp. 32–33, 113–19.
29. Stéphane Dion, "Why Is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec," *British Journal of Political Science*, 26 (April 1996), 269–83; Hudson Meadwell, "The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec," *World Politics*, 45 (January 1993), 203–6.
30. Keating, *Nations against the State*; Hudson Meadwell and Pierre Martin, "Economic Integration and the Politics of Independence," *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (Winter 1996), 67–87.
31. Meadwell and Martin, pp. 74–75.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 75–76.
33. Uit Zelfverdediging, "Verkiezingsprogramma 1991, Vlaams Blok, Eigen Volk Eerst."
34. Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 139.
35. Dwayne Woods, "The Crisis of Center-Periphery Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional Populism: The Lombard League," *Comparative Politics*, 27 (January 1995), 187–203.
36. The League abandoned concern with linguistic issues.

37. Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
38. *Courrier Hebdomadaire du CRISP*, "La Volksunie (I)" (September 1966), "La Volksunie (II)" (December 1966).
39. Woods, p. 190.
40. Michael Keating, "Reforging the Union: Devolution and Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom," *Publius*, 28 (Winter 1998), 221.
41. See his reply to John Hargreaves, "A Reply to Keating on Stateless Nation-Building in Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland," *Nations and Nationalism*, 4 (October 1998), 569–78.
42. The Scottish Office, "Scotland's Parliament: Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Scotland by Command of Her Majesty, July 1997," p. v.
43. Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr., "Belgium: Variations on the Theme of Territorial Accommodation," in Rudolph and Thompson, eds.
44. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, *Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), pp. 279–307.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
48. Michael O'Neill, "Peace Dropping Slow: Answering the Irish Question?," *The Round Table* (1998), 464.
49. Francisco Llera, "Conflicto en Euskadi Revisited," in Richard Gunther, ed., *Politics, Society, and Democracy: The Case of Spain* (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 189–91.
50. Beñat Isturitz, "A Europe of Regions? European Integration and the Basque Country," *Euskal Herria Journal* (April 1998).
51. Newman, "Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict?," p. 478.

LINKED CITATIONS

- Page 1 of 2 -



You have printed the following article:

Nationalism in Postindustrial Societies: Why States Still Matter

Saul Newman

Comparative Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Oct., 2000), pp. 21-41.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-4159%28200010%2933%3A1%3C21%3ANIPSW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M>

This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.

[Footnotes]

²⁹ **Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec**

Stephane Dion

British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 269-283.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-1234%28199604%2926%3A2%3C269%3AWISDIW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K>

²⁹ **The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec**

Hudson Meadwell

World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 2. (Jan., 1993), pp. 203-241.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-8871%28199301%2945%3A2%3C203%3ATPONI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3>

³⁵ **The Crisis of Center-Periphery Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional Populism: The Lombard League**

Dwayne Woods

Comparative Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2. (Jan., 1995), pp. 187-203.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-4159%28199501%2927%3A2%3C187%3ATCOCI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P>

NOTE: *The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.*

LINKED CITATIONS

- Page 2 of 2 -



³⁹ **The Crisis of Center-Periphery Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional Populism: The Lombard League**

Dwayne Woods

Comparative Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2. (Jan., 1995), pp. 187-203.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-4159%28199501%2927%3A2%3C187%3ATCOCII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P>

⁴⁰ **Reforging the Union: Devolution and Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom**

Michael Keating

Publius, Vol. 28, No. 1, The State of American Federalism, 1997-1998. (Winter, 1998), pp. 217-234.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0048-5950%28199824%2928%3A1%3C217%3ARTUDAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1>